How China uses its distant water fishing fleet to expand global influence?

By Argenis RODRIGUEZ (maritime lawyer)

The world’s largest long-distance fishing fleet

China has the largest long-distance fishing fleet in the world. According to data provided by the Chinese government, its distant water fishing fleet consists of 1,498 vessels¹. Another source estimates that Chinese fishing vessels number 4,615². Other sources go much further and state that this fleet consists of approximately 17,000 fishing vessels³.

Although the actual number of Chinese fishing fleets is uncertain, it has been argued that the fishing activities carried out by this fleet are unsustainable, putting a large number of marine species at risk.

China’s leading role in global capture fisheries

China has established itself as the world’s leading country in capture fisheries. In large part, its prominent position is related to the increase in Chinese cephalopod catches in the Southeast Pacific and Southwest Atlantic, close to the Latin American coasts, officially amounting to more than half a million additional tons⁴. 

The Chinese distant water fleet catches between 50 and 70% of the world’s total deepsea squid catch. Chinese fishing methods and activities within the EEZ of Argentina, Ecuador and other Latin American countries are highly controversial⁵. Chinese vessels often operate right on the outer borders of several countries, such as Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, thereby targeting migratory species like giant squid, disrupting their biological cycle. Lerena explains this problem in more detail:

“Argentina, through Laws 24,543 and 24,922, claimed its rights over these resources, since their total biomass is found in its EEZ, where these species carry out a large part of their main stages of their biological cycle, until they migrate to the high seas where they are captured by foreign vessels, and finally – those that manage to evade these captures – return to national jurisdiction; this last movement being the condition for considering a resource as ‘migratory’. (…) Foreign vessels that uncontrolled fish on the high seas break this biological cycle, since ecologically, the species needs to return to the EEZ where it carries out its most important biological stage and, as the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries states: ‘States must apply the Precautionary Approach in the exploitation of resources, taking into account critical habitat.’ The case of the Patagonian squid (Argentina) is a typical example, since it begins its annual life cycle in the continental area of the Argentine EEZ, migrates to the Malvinas area and from the slope returns to the original area of the cycle; Therefore, its uncontrolled capture in the Malvinas or on the high seas not only hinders its sustainability but, since its trophic ecology is linked to other species, where it acts as predator or prey, affects all the species with which it interacts in the ecosystem (…), which in Argentina are central to food, the generation of industries and employment.”⁶

Government subsidies and fleet modernization

The large number of Chinese vessels operating long distance is largely due to subsidies carried out by the People’s Republic of China in recent years, without subsidies long distance fishing would be much less profitable. As stated by the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI): “Without these subsidies, many types of distant water fishing, such as squid fishing, would not be profitable. Beijing not only subsidizes its fishing vessels’ activities, but it also supports the modernization and growth of its fleet. For around a decade, China has helped pay for larger and more advanced fishing vessels that can venture further afield. These newer fishing vessels have larger nets, more powerful engines, and feature steel construction, compared to older wooden vessels”⁷.

China’s share of global fishing activity

According to the Financial Transparency Coalition (2023), the 10 companies most involved in IUU fishing account for approximately 25% of this practice, with eight of them being Chinese, one Colombian, and one Spanish. It is estimated that the industrial catch of the Chinese fleet on the high seas represents 65% of the unreported catch on the high seas and 17% of the total catch on the high seas, averaged from 1980 to 2019⁸.

Oceana⁹ made an analysis of China’s apparent fishing activity over a three-year period, from January 1, 2022, to December 31, 2024:

• 57,000 fishing vessels, primarily trawlers, flagged to China appeared to fish for more than 110 million hours,
• China’s fishing vessels appeared to conduct 44% of the global fishing activity during this period,
• Chinese vessels accounted for 30% of all fishing activity on the high seas, appearing to fish for more than 8.3 million hours,
• China’s fishing vessels were most active in South Korea (11.8 million hours), Taiwan (4.4 million hours), Japan (1.5 million hours), Kiribati (almost 425,000 hours), and Papua New Guinea (over 415,000 hours),
• China appeared to fish in more than 90 countries’ waters for more than 22 million hours.

Geopolitical influence and global dependence

While there is a regulatory framework implemented by RFMOs to limit high seas fishing, sometimes these regulations may not be as effective given the enormous geopolitical weight that China exerts. As the Office of Naval Intelligence explains: “The interconnectedness of China’s fishing investments and its other infrastructure development projects can make it difficult for governments reliant on Chinese financing to untangle the possible impacts of impeding Chinese global fishing while working with China on unrelated projects. This can be observed in cases where the Chinese DWF fleet causes tension with local populations or governments, but resisting the Chinese fishing activity could undermine other projects with Chinese financing or being completed by Chinese companies”¹⁰.

There have also been allegations of human rights violations on board Chinese fishing vessels. Workers have spoken of physical and verbal abuse, grueling hours, inadequate food and water, and forced labor at the hands of Chinese captains and senior crew.¹¹

Transparency issues in chinese fishing operations

Global Fishing Watch has identified transparency issues that hamper the monitoring of species caught by Chinese vessels¹²:

• Multiple MMSI numbers: Some vessels used multiple Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI) numbers, ie, identification numbers assigned by the flag country and intended to be unique. Nineteen of the 615 vessels operating throughout the eastern and southeastern Pacific Ocean used multiple AIS devices and collectively transmitted 41 different MMSI numbers.
• Shared MMSI numbers: A single MMSI number was also observed to be used more than once on 47 different squid vessels, all flagged to China. The analysis shows that the most common instances of shared MMSI numbers occurred when a vessel was fishing in Latin American waters, while its partner vessel was several thousand miles away in Chinese waters.
• False AIS positions: Also known as redirection or “spoofing,” vessel operators can transmit an AIS position that is actually outside the reception footprint of the receiving satellite. In other words, they can make it appear that the vessel they are operating on is not where it really is. A total of 16 squid vessels, all flagged in China, were identified with AIS positions outside the perimeter of their receiving satellite.

1. Vigo Lighthouse. China strengthens aid for deep-sea fishing with larger vessels . Accessed June 27, 2025. Available: https://www.farodevigo.es/mar/2025/01/23/china-refuerza-ayudas-pesca-gran-113630232.html  ↩︎
2. The PEW Charitable Trust. Most long-distance fishing in foreign waters is dominated by just a few governments , p. 4. Available: https://www.pew.org/-/media/assets/2022/08/most-long-distance-fishing_esla.pdf  ↩︎
3. ODI Global Report. China’s distant-water fishing fleet, p. 15. Available: https://media.odi.org/documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web.pdf ; see also InSight Crime. Illegal fishing by Chinese fleet targets Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. Accessed June 27, 2025. Available: https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/pesca-i
   legal-china-ecuador-chile-peru/  ↩︎
4. Andrés González Martín. The Chinese fishing army threatens Latin America, p. 5. Available: https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/2021/DIEEEA09_2021_ANDGON_PescaChina_ENG.pdf  ↩︎
5. Andrés González Martín. The Chinese fishing army threatens Latin America, p. 5. ↩︎
6. César Augusto Lerena. Argentine Society for Strategic and Global Studies. High Seas Fishing is Illegal: A Biological Interpretation . Accessed July 10, 2025. Available: https://saeeg.org/index.php/2021/11/26/high-seas-fishing-is-illegal-a-biological-interpretation/  ↩︎
7. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Foreign Governments’ Use of Their Distant Water Fishing Fleets as Extensions of Their Maritime Security Forces and Foreign Policies, p. 14. Available: https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/reading_room/20210616_Congressional%20Report_Final%20-%20%2019AUG21.pdf  ↩︎
8. Nicole Jenne, Johannes Rehner, and Luciano Quispe. Chinese Vessels and Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing off the Pacific Coast of South America , p. 8. Available: https://zenodo.org/records/14004234 ↩︎
9. Oceana. China Dominates 44% of Visible Fishing Activity Worldwide. Accessed August 1, 2025. Available: https://oceana.org/press-releases/china-dominates-44-of-visible-fishing-activity-worldwide/  ↩︎
10. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Foreign Governments’ Use of Their Distant Water Fishing Fleets as Extensions of Their Maritime Security Forces and Foreign Policies, p. 22. ↩︎
11. Environmental Justice Foundation. Global impact of illegal fishing and human rights abuse in China’s vast distant water fleet revealed. Accessed July 25, 2025. Available: https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/global-impact-of-illegal-fishing-and-human-rights-abuse-in-chinas-vast-distant-water-fleet-revealed-2  ↩︎
12. Global Fishing Watch. An analysis of the 2020 squid season reveals key players and the true extent of fishing activity. Accessed August 1, 2025.Available:
    https://globalfishingwatch.org/article/getting-to-know-the-squid-in-the-pacific/  ↩︎