France has denied reports that it might renounce sovereignty over the uninhabited volcanic islets of Matthew and Hunter in the southern Pacific, a long‑running dispute with Vanuatu that resurfaced in December 2025. The French Foreign Ministry said claims of an imminent concession were “false”, while acknowledging that the unresolved contention since Vanuatu’s independence in 1980 has complicated maritime boundary delimitation and affected activities such as fishing and scientific research, as reflected in the user‑provided source and in recent coverage by AFP and Le Monde (Foreign Ministry denial cited by AFP; Le Monde analysis, 18 Dec 2025). Paris and Port Vila relaunched talks in late 2025, with further discussions planned in Paris in early 2026.
Why two tiny islets matter: EEZ footprint, resources and access
Perched a few hundred kilometres east of New Caledonia, Matthew and Hunter—known in Vanuatu as Umaenupne and Leka—are uninhabited yet strategically consequential. Sovereignty over them underpins a large share of New Caledonia’s exclusive economic zone, variously estimated around 350 000 km², an order of magnitude echoed by parliamentary filings in France and major press reports (Senate written question, 12 Dec 2025; Le Monde, French edition). The user provided source similarly emphasises that these islets account for roughly a fifth of New Caledonia’s EEZ, with implications for fisheries access, research permits and maritime patrol coverage. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the status of islands and rocks governs entitlement to maritime zones (UNCLOS Article 121), while delimitation between adjacent states aims at an equitable solution (UNCLOS Articles 74 & 83).
Beyond living resources, control of the EEZ also structures rights over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, including potential energy and mineral prospects. While no specific exploitation plan has been publicly announced, the economic relevance is clear for both parties: Vanuatu’s budget benefits substantially from the sale of fishing licences, making any enlargement of its EEZ a material issue for state revenue (regional background on fisheries dependence).
A four‑decade dispute: claims, acts of administration and milestones
The sovereignty contention has persisted since Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, though the islets were incorporated into New Caledonia’s dependencies decades earlier; France points to scientific and military missions from the 1950s and to positions taken jointly with the United Kingdom in the 1960s asserting attachment to New Caledonia. The dispute has periodically flared when enforcement or access incidents occurred. France also notes that its maritime delimitations with Australia (1982) and Fiji (1983) implicitly reflected its administration of Matthew and Hunter, a context summarised in recent reporting (Le Monde (EN), chronology).
For Vanuatu, the claim combines economic logic and cultural legitimacy. Authorities in Port Vila argue that communities in the south of the archipelago have long maintained customary links to the islets, a point that France says it is willing to hear within the negotiation framework, without conceding on sovereignty. The political resonance extends into New Caledonia: the pro‑independence “Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste”(FLNKS) has repeatedly expressed support for Vanuatu’s position, including through the Kéamu declaration signed in 2009, which recognised the islets as places of customary significance (ANU research on the Kéamu accord; regional policy brief referencing Kéamu).
December 2025: official denial, political debate, and a negotiation track
The latest controversy was fuelled by political statements in France suggesting impending territorial concessions. The Foreign Ministry dismissed these as baseless, reiterating that no “cession” or “renunciation” is under discussion; instead, both governments are working on maritime delimitation arrangements reopened in late 2025 after leadership changes in Port Vila (AFP post; Le Monde (FR)). The timeline aligns with a joint communiqué issued after President Emmanuel Macron’s meeting with Prime Minister Jotham Napat on 23 July 2025, and with a preliminary exchange held in Port Vila on 20–21 November 2025; further talks are planned in early 2026 in Paris. Within France, the debate has drawn interventions from opposition figures and the tabling of written parliamentary questions stressing the strategic consequences of any change, including the oft‑cited ~350 000 km² EEZ figure.
Law of the Sea options: sovereignty, delimitation and workable compromises
The legal issues intertwine sovereignty over land and the delimitation of maritime zones. Under UNCLOS Article 121, “islands” generate an EEZ and continental shelf; “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own” do not generate an EEZ, only a territorial sea. The classification of Matthew and Hunter has not been adjudicated by an international court and remains contested in argument rather than in law. In parallel, UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 require adjacent states to pursue an “equitable solution” for EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, encouraging provisional arrangements pending a final delimitation.
Practical pathways often seen in comparable disputes include:
- Maritime‑first delimitation while deferring the question of sovereignty, through a boundary line or a zone of shared management.
- Provisional fisheries arrangements that regularise licensing, monitoring and data exchange without prejudice to claims.
- Scientific co‑management of protected areas if ecological sensitivities warrant it.
- Joint development zones for non‑living resources, contingent on environmental safeguards and clear revenue‑sharing formulas.
Each pathway carries risks: precedent for other French overseas disputes; domestic politics in New Caledonia and Vanuatu; and the practicalities of maritime enforcement over remote waters. Yet they offer legally orthodox tools that preserve positions while reducing uncertainty for fishers, coastguards and researchers.
Strategic signalling in the Indo‑Pacific: balancing firmness and regional ties
The dispute intersects with France’s wider Indo‑Pacific posture anchored in New Caledonia, which provides basing for maritime surveillance and regional engagement. French officials argue that maintaining sovereign claims is compatible with cooperative management of maritime spaces. For Vanuatu, which relies on licence revenue and emphasises customary connections to these islets, a negotiated settlement that expands legal certainty—and potentially access—has clear incentives. Regional politics also intrude: New Caledonia’s FLNKS movement supports Vanuatu’s claim on customary grounds (Kéamu, 2009), while Port Vila calibrates relations with external partners as it navigates development needs (ANU analysis of FLNKS positions).
Bottom line: the December 2025 denial from Paris narrows the political space for any sovereignty trade‑off, but leaves ample room for maritime‑only solutions. Given that both sides have recommitted to a structured negotiation calendar into early 2026, the most realistic near‑term outcome is an interim arrangement on fisheries and research that reduces operational friction while preserving legal positions.
