By Argenis RODRIGUEZ (maritime lawyer)
The Chinese fishing fleet has been consistently accused of engaging in Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU Fishing), posing a significant risk to the marine environment and the sustainability of living resources.
What IUU Fishing is and why it matters
Although all States have the right to fish on the high seas, this activity violates international law when it is illegal, unreported or unregulated, for example: fishing in an area governed by a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) without the flag State being part of it or, if it is part of the RMFO, the regulations issued by it are violated, or the quantities caught on the high seas are not fully declared, etc.
IUU Fishing is, in most cases, in violation of international law, and undermines efforts to conserve and manage fish stocks in all capture fisheries. IUU fishing can lead to the collapse of a fishery or seriously impair efforts to rebuild stocks that have already been depleted.1
In the case of the People’s Republic of China, this is the State with the highest IUU Fishing risk index according to the IUU Fishing Risk Index, using data corresponding to the year 2023. This index does not measure exactly how many vessels engage in IUU Fishing or how large such fishing is, but rather measures the risk of vessels in each
country engaging in these practices. The higher this index for a State, the more deficient are the measures implemented to prevent and combat IUU Fishing.2
China has an overall IUU fishing risk index rating of 3.69 out of 5.0, which, as previously mentioned, is the highest in the world. This is because, given the size of the Chinese fishing fleet, it is difficult for the Chinese State itself to maintain effective control over all its fishing vessels operating on the high seas.
There is no precise data on IUU fishing actually carried out by Chinese vessels, but it has been stated that at least 183 Chinese fishing vessels are suspected of engaging in illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing activities, although there may actually be more. 3
The above leads us to understand that there are several Chinese vessels that engage in IUU fishing, although it is impossible to confirm exactly how many there are, and for that reason it cannot be stated that the majority of these vessels engage in such practices, in the absence of more detailed information.
However, it must be noted that China is a party to several RFMOs, which shows a certain degree of commitment to combat IUU Fishing.
China is a party to the following RFMOs: the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO), the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission (NPFC), and the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).
Measures taken by the People’s Republic of China against IUU Fishing
While the Chinese fishing fleet has engaged in fishing activities that in some cases could be considered excessive, it is worth noting that the Chinese State has taken several measures in the last few years to combat IUU fishing.
In 2020, the “Administrative Regulations for Distant-Water Fisheries (RDWF)” wassanctioned. As Chinese authors explain, the RDWF implements a blacklist system to prohibit non-compliant vessels from functioning. RDWF acknowledges the other coastal states’ authority to preserve and exploit living resources within the EEZ. According to Article 10 and Article 30.2 of RDWF, fishing vessels operating in foreign EEZs must secure fishing authorization from the relevant governmental authority of that state and comply with boarding inspections by the competent authorities. And Chinese-flagged fishing vessels must maintain a buffer distance from the outer boundaries of other governments’ fisheries authorities where they lack authority to operate. For vessels
fishing on the high seas, Article 31.1 of RDWF requires the pelagic fishing vessels which operate on high seas to obtain the approval of MARA to conduct fishing activities with the restriction of area, time, species, and ration. Fishing vessels that contravene the specified conditions shall incur administrative purposes as stipulated in Chapter 7 of RDWF, hence ensuring the successful implementation of flag state management.4
This regulation is a very important step forward, although the penalties applied are somewhat lax compared to those imposed in other countries.
China has also implemented executive measures to reduce IUU Fishing:
- Mandatory installation of vessel monitoring systems (VMS), which serve as a
prerequisite for companies to apply for distant water fishing projects. - A registration system that blacklists vessel captains who have violated domestic
distant water fishing regulations and keeps them out of the industry because they
cannot be employed until they meet the required certification. - Reduction of government subsidies, replacing fuel subsidies with financial
support for vessel renovations. - Improved data collection, especially for tuna, squid, mackerel, and Antarctic krill,
although species and fishing areas for other catches still need to be classified. - Increasing vessel-based observer coverage, China launched its graduated
observer program for tuna fishing in 2001. However, the program is enabled
while professional training is completed, and there is sometimes a shortage of
experienced observers. Therefore, in 2016, a professional observer training
program began to be developed for candidates with other educational
backgrounds. - Crew and skipper training provided by the China Distant Water Fisheries
Association and Shanghai Ocean University.”5 - Obligation to report transshipments. A MARA notice requires reporting of all transshipments on the high seas. Vessels must comply with RFMO management measures, accommodate transshipment observers, and ensure adequate monitoring and data collection.6
- Sanctions for offending companies. Between 2016 and 2017, MARA, under the motto of “zero tolerance,” sanctioned 264 vessels belonging to 78 fishing companies, reducing their subsidies by 700 million yuan, canceling the operations of three companies, and placing five offenders on the “blacklist” for the activity.7
China also ratified in this year 2025 the Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (PSMA), which seeks to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing through the adoption and implementation of effective port State measures as a means of ensuring the long-term conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources8. While this
Agreement focuses on the measures that States Parties must take as port states, China, as a flag state, has the obligation to provide maximum cooperation to port states conducting inspections of Chinese vessels when those states have substantial grounds to believe that Chinese vessels have engaged in IUU fishing, or when the Chinese State itself has reason to believe that its vessels have engaged in these activities. The ratification of the PSMA by the People’s Republic of China is a step in the right direction.
What still needs to happen for sustainable fisheries
Other agreements that China must ratify, to show a serious and unequivocal commitment in favor of sustainable fishing, are the FAO Compliance Agreement, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), and the Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement).
By ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement, China would be making a serious commitment to strengthening control over its vessels fishing on the high seas.
Additionally, by ratifying the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the People’s Republic of China would undertake not to fish in areas regulated by RFMOs while it is not a Member State or Cooperating Party to those organizations, pursuant to Article 8, paragraph 4 of the UNFSA.
Finally, it would be beneficial if China ratified the BBNJ Agreement (which will enter into force on January 17, 2026). While the BBNJ Agreement does not directly apply to fishing activities, pursuant to its Article 10, unless captured fish or other marine living resources are regulated as utilization under the agreement, this instrument could complement the sustainable management of living resources by establishing area- based management mechanisms, including marine protected areas.
The People’s Republic of China, as the world’s leading fishing power, must set an example and exercise greater control over its fishing fleet.
- Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). INTERNATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT,
DETER AND ELIMINATE ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED FISHING. Available:
https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/a80c3bfb-1d5b-4ee6-9c85-54b7e83986a2/content ↩︎ - IUU Fishing Risk Index. Accessed July 6, 2025. Available: https://www.iuufishingindex.net/about ↩︎
- DI Global Report, China’s distant-water fishing fleet, p. 26. Available:
https://media.odi.org/documents/chinesedistantwaterfishing_web.pdf ↩︎ - Qing Zhao, Xuexin Yi and Ming Jing. Incremental Progress in Combating IUU Fishing: A Review of China’s
2020 Administrative Regulations for Distant-Water Fisheries. Accessed July 9, 2025. Available:
https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/14/4/42#B20-laws-14-00042 ↩︎ - Andrea Vargas Cárdenas and Bárbara Horzella Cutbill. International Aspects of Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, p. 11. Available at:
https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=repositorio%2F10221%2F30322%2F1%2FConvencion_
Pesca_INDR.pdf ↩︎ - Shuo Li. Combating IUU fishing: an examination of interaction between China and regional fisheries
management organizations . Accessed July 14, 2025. Available:
https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/marine-science/articles/10.3389/fmars.2025.1601534/full
↩︎ - Eduardo Daniel Oviedo. Argentina and Chinese Illegal Fishing: A Perspective from International
Relations, p. 37. Available:
https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/handle/11336/224939/CONICET_Digital_Nro.5fa48b29-b9ae-4d30-
8a88-4343eb01eea4_B.pdf ↩︎ - FAO. Agreement on Port State Measures (PSMA). Accessed July 15, 2025. Available: https://www.fao.org/port-state-measures/resources/detail/en/c/1111616/ ↩︎
